

Centro de Pesquisas sobre Governação e Desenvolvimento

Born Frees' Attitudes towards Democracy in Mozambique A Comparative Study of Political Generations

Carlos Shenga

CPGD Working Paper No. 8

May 2017

About the Author

Carlos Shenga is the founder of the Centre for Research on Governance and Development (CPGD). Carlos holds doctorate and master degrees in political studies from the University of Cape Town and honours and bachelor degrees, respectively, in public administration and social science from Eduardo Mondlane University, Mozambique.

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For more information contact: info@cpgd.org.mz

Abstract

Mozambican's political attitudes towards democracy tend to be widely known with cross-sectional public opinion surveys on the subject being conducted in the country systematically over more than a decade. However the attitude of Mozambique's born frees - those citizens who were born and raised since the country's first democratic multiparty elections in 1994 - tend not to be known. In searching for whether being born and growing up in a democratic context matters, this study tests the generational effect on attitudes toward democracy, controlling for other factors, using Afrobarometer survey data from 2015. It finds that different political generations have differing attitudes towards democracy and that Mozambique's born frees appear to be negatively associated with democracy. Discussion of these findings suggests the need for inculcating 'apprentice-citizens' on the workings of institutions of representative democracy; and rights and responsibilities of democratic citizenship within schools.

Born Frees' Attitudes towards Democracy in Mozambique A Comparative Study of Political Generations

1. Introduction

Mozambique has experienced two authoritarian governments: first, the colonial government from 1920/30 to 1974, and second, one-party government from 1975 to 1989. In 1994, Mozambique conducted its founding multiparty election. But before that, even though Mozambique continued with a one-party system, the country was characterized by a transitional period marked by the adoption of the democratic Constitution in 1990 and formation of new political parties, civil society organizations and non-state media. Since the founding multiparty election, and subsequent regular multiparty elections, Mozambique has experienced at least four complete democratic governments: two led by Joaquim Chissano (1995-1999, 2000-2004), two led by Armando Guebuza (2005-2009, 2010-2014), and the current government led by Filipe Nyusi (2015-present).¹

These authoritarian and democratic governments produced different political generations² in Mozambique - understood as "groups of individuals of similar ages who have experienced a noteworthy historical event at the same time and who think or behave in a manner that is distinct from older (and perhaps younger) individuals" (Mattes, Denemark and Niemi 2016). Based on this conception at least five political generations can be identified in Mozambique (as outlined in Table 1) and this study aims to assess their impacts on different political and social aspects.

The first generation is characterised by those citizens who experienced the Portuguese colonial authoritarian rule from 1920/30³ to 1974⁴ (Table 1). This generation of citizens experienced unpaid and forced labour, abuse by *Cipaios*,⁵ secular rather than laic state, racial discrimination, assimilation policy consisting of denying cultural tradition to favour the European one, limitations of freedoms, and the FRELIMO⁶ armed struggle for the country's independence. This generation, I call the 'colonial generation'. It is the generation of those who were born from 1912 to 1956 and turned 18 years old during the colonial authoritarian period (1930-1974).

Zambesi Valley, 1850-1921. University of California Press).

¹ At the subnational municipal level, the country conducted the founding multiparty municipal election in 1998 and since then it has regularly conducted three municipal elections.

² The term political generation is interchangeably used in this study as generational cohort.

³ Around 1920/30 Portugal started with its colonial administration of Mozambique after a military campaign for effective domination of the country as the aftermath of Berlin Conference in 1884-5. The last major resistance to colonial domination in Mozambique was the Barue Resistance in 1917 that was destroyed by Portugal in early 1920 (see Allen F. Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman 1976. *The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique: The*

⁴ 7 September 1974 is known as Victory Day in Mozambique, the day that is observed to celebrate the signing of the Lusaka Accord officially ending the Mozambique war of independence.

⁵ In the territory of Mozambique, *Cipaios* were soldiers for rural and local patrolling under the command of European (Portuguese) officials. <u>https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sipai</u>

⁶ FRELIMO means Front of Liberation of Mozambique. When it is written in small characters on this paper it means that it is referring to a political party.

Age	Generational Cohort	Years of event	Event	Birth years
Turned 18 during colonial domination (1930-1974)	Colonial	1920/30-1974	Colonial domination	1912-1956
Turned 18 during one-party rule (1975-1989)	One-party	1975-1989	One-party rule	1957-1971
Turned 18 during transition from 'not free' to 'free' society (1990-1993)	Transitional	1990-1993	Transition to democracy	1972-1975
Turned 18 during the first democratic period (1994-2011)	Free	1994-2011	Democracy (1 st period)	1976-1993
Turned 18 during the second period of democracy initiated by born frees (2012-present)	Born-frees	2012-present	Democracy (2 nd period)	1994- present

Table 1: Identification of Mozambique Political Generation by Age at the Time of a Significant Event

The second generation is comprised of those who experienced Frelimo one-party authoritarian rule from the post-independence in 1975 to Frelimo political reform in 1989 that led to the democratic constitution in 1990. This post-independence generation experienced a centrally planned economy, Marxism-Leninism party-state, limitation of freedoms as well as a civil or destabilization war between the government and Renamo (Mozambique National Resistance). I call this generation the 'one-party generation'. It is the generational cohort of those who were born from 1957 to 1971 and turned 18 years old during the years of one-party rule (1975-1989).

The third is the generation that transited from a 'not free' to 'free' society between 1990 and 1993. It is the generation of those citizens who experienced in their adulthood the adoption of the democratic Constitution in 1990, signing of the peace agreement between the government and Renamo in 1992 followed by the demobilization of government and Renamo soldiers and their reintegration in society, the formation of new and other political parties in addition to the ruling party, and creation of civil society organizations and private or independent media. This is the generation that saw the country transiting from one-party to multiparty politics by engineering democratic rules of procedure aimed at delivering democratic goods. I call this generation the 'transitional generation'. It is the generation of those who turned 18 years old during the transitional period toward democracy (1990-1993). They were born from 1972 to 1975.

The fourth generational cohort is the 'free generation'. This is the generation of those citizens who during the transitional period toward democracy were 'apprentice-citizens' i.e. 14-17 years old. They grew up democratic in their teenagerhood but were not born free. They had the advantage to experience the transition and formation of democratic institutions, procedures and values to exert their democratic rights and duties after the transitional period. They voted for the first time when the country was also voting for the first time in the 1994 founding democratic election. They continued voting in the subsequent elections. This is the generation of adults

born between 1976 and 1993. It begins with those who reached adulthood in the country's first period of democracy (1994-2011).

The 'born frees' are the fifth Mozambique political generation. This generation does not have much life experience compared to all others. But it is composed of those citizens who were born during democratic politics from 1994 onwards. It entails the generational cohort of those citizens who did not only grow up democratic but also were born free.

This study seeks to examine whether being born free and growing up democratic matters for an individuals' political engagement, their modernity and commitment to, and understand of, democracy and knowledge about democratic citizenship. The political attitudes of Mozambicans in general tend to be widely known with cross-sectional public opinion surveys on democracy being conducted in the country systematically over time since 2002 (Pereira et al 2002, 2003, Shenga 2007, Mattes and Shenga 2009, Shenga and Howe 2017)⁷ but the attitudes of born frees tend not to be known at all. Mozambican born frees attained voting age in 2012 and in the 2014 election they were able to vote for the first time in their lifetime. In the Afrobarometer cross sectional public opinion survey series on attitudes toward democracy, their attitudes were only firstly captured in the 2015 survey. To our knowledge this paper is the first study of the impact of being born free and growing up democratic simultaneously in the context of Mozambique.

Hypotheses and Arguments

Mozambique's born frees are expected to be less likely than other political generations to be engaged in politics. This hypothesis is based on Shenga and Howe's (2017) assessment of youth political engagement in Mozambique from 2002 to 2005, 2008, 2012 and 2015, using public opinion surveys. Shenga and Howe (2017) found that Mozambique's young adults are less likely to be interested in public affairs, discuss politics, contact leaders, vote, identify with a political party, become a member of a voluntary association or community group, and commune. The low levels of born frees' engagement in politics is also based on their life experience. As they are at an early stage of their lives and career, most tend to still struggle to get a degree, to find a better job or even to complete secondary school. "They do not have a house, stable residence [and] children" (Quintelier 2007). This leaves them in a situation of not being much concerned with political engagement.

But the born frees are expected to be more likely than other political generations to be modern; committed to, and understand democracy; and knowledgeable about democratic citizenship.

That born frees are more likely to be modern is from connecting with information and communication technologies (ICTs), with the internet at the forefront, for their civic learning (Dahlgren 2007, Mossberger, Tolbert, and McNeal 2008). "Internet is

⁷ Afrobarometer surveys were conducted in Mozambique in 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012 and 2015. See <u>www.afrobarometer.org</u>

associated with greater increases in political knowledge among the young" (McDonald 2008).

That born frees are more likely to be committed to, and understand, democracy and be knowledgeable about democratic citizenship is because they were born and grew up democratic. The first and lifetime experience of the current young generations is with "[democratic] institutions procedures and values" (Mattes, Denemark and Niemi 2016:4). Their "exposure to increasingly universal public education" (Mattes, Denemark and Niemi 2016) and political knowledge through new media (Dahlgren 2007, McDonald 2008), which are factors conducive to supporting democracy (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005), and constitute some indications for this hypothesis to be true.

While this study tests primarily the effect of political generations on attitudes toward democracy, it also considers simultaneously the impacts of other factors. It considers first the effect of political engagement; individuals who engage actively in politics are expected to form positive attitudes toward democracy. Shenga (2007) found that Mozambicans who engaged themselves in discussion of politics were more likely to be committed to democracy and those who engaged in political processes by becoming interested in public affairs were more likely to understand democracy procedurally. Political engagement through contact with political leaders, communing, group membership and party identification appeared also to have significant effect on attitudes toward democracy (Shenga 2007). Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005:267) found that Africans who engage actively in politics by communing and contacting, identifying themselves with the winning party and voted in elections were more likely to form positive attitudes toward democracy.

Secondly, this study considers the effect of modernization. Lipset (1959) pointed out certain conditions (including industrialization, urbanization, wealth and education) of modernization for democratic legitimacy and consolidation. Based on this, this study expects that modern individuals will be more likely to adopt positive attitudes toward democracy.

Data and methods

This study tests these hypotheses using cross-sectional public opinion data from Afrobarometer from 2015. In that year the Afrobarometer surveyed through a face-to-face structured questionnaire a nationally representative, random, stratified probability sample of 2,400 ordinary Mozambicans. The survey sample was drawn by taking the smallest geographic units, Census Enumeration Areas (EAs), and stratifying all EAs across the country into separate lists according to province and urban or rural status. 300 AEs were then randomly selected from these lists with the probability proportionate to its size in the overall population. This ensures that every eligible adult had an equal and known chance of being selected. Eight households were then randomly selected within each EA, and a respondent 18 years of age or

older was randomly selected from each household. A gender quota ensured that every other interview must be with a female.⁸

This study employs a quantitative method, suggesting that all of its data is coded and post-coded in the form of numbers (Blaikie 2003). It tests first, the impact of political generations on political engagement, modernization and attitudes toward democracy, using bivariate statistical techniques. Second, it tests the impact of political generations on attitudes toward democracy simultaneously considering the effect of modernization and political engagement, employing multivariate regression.

The structure of the study

This study firstly assesses whether growing up democratic matters for political engagement, modernity and attitudes toward democracy. But before that it also provides the overall picture of the extent to which Mozambicans engage in politics, are modern, committed to, and understand, democracy and are knowledgeable about democratic citizenship. Secondly it tests and examines the effect of growing up democratic simultaneously with other factors on attitudes toward democracy. Finally, it summarizes the conclusion and discusses them.

2. Political Engagement

This study measures political engagement by contacting political leaders, communing, voting, affiliating in political party, membership in voluntary association or community group, engaging cognitively in public affairs and politics (Shenga and Howe 2017) and engaging in electoral campaigns. To what extent are born frees engaged in politics compared to other generational cohorts? Does being born and growing up democratic matter for political engagement?

Before assessing this I describe the patterns of political generations. The 2015 Afrobarometer survey shows that six out of ten (59 percent) of respondents are from the free generation and the rest is a combination of other generational cohorts: one-party (with 15 percent); born frees (with 12 percent); and transitional and colonial generations both with 7 percent.

Cognitive Engagement

Cognitive engagement is measured by interest in public affairs and political discussion (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005, Shenga 2007). The Afrobarometer results in Table 2 show overall that levels of Mozambicans' cognitive engagement are shallow. Only about 54 percent of Mozambicans are interested in public affairs and 58 percent discuss politics with others.⁹

⁸ For information about Afrobarometer data and methodology look at <u>www.afrobarometer.org</u> where the data can be also downloaded.

⁹ Although the average of 36 African multiparty systems (56 percent) is about the same with the Mozambique level of interest in public affairs (54 percent), the African average of political discussion (67 percent) is higher than that of Mozambique (58 percent).

Comparing generations, the born frees lead in being 'very interested/somewhat interested' in public affairs but the one-party generation is least likely to do so than any other generation. There is no significant difference between colonial, transitional and free generations on 'very/somewhat interested' in politics. With respect to discussion of politics, the born frees and transitional generations are more likely to discuss politics with others 'occasionally/frequently' than other generations. No statistical difference is evident among other political generations on discussing politics with others 'occasionally/frequently' (Table 2).

			Poli	tical Generati	on		
			One party	Transitional	Free	Born free	Total
Interest in public	Not interest at all/Don't know	32%	29%	26%	27%	22%	27%
	Not very interested	13%	23%	17%	19%	15%	18%
affairs	Somewhat interested	30%	25%	30%	32%	37%	31%
	Very interested	25%	22%	26%	22%	26%	23%
Diaguag	Never/Don't know	46%	44%	36%	43%	35%	42%
Discuss politics	Occasionally	44%	39%	46%	45%	46%	44%
	Frequently	10%	16%	18%	12%	19%	14%

Table 2: Cognitive Engagement by Political Generation

Interest in public affairs is measured by the following question: *How interested would you say you are in public affairs?* **Discussion of politics is measured by question:** *When you get together with your friends or family, would you say you discuss political matters?*

Contacting Political Leaders

Mozambicans' level of contacting political leaders is very shallow. The levels of contacting political leaders are only equal to or below 10 percent. Only 10 percent of Mozambicans said that they have contacted at least once a local councilor, 6 percent a member of parliament, and 9 percent a government official. Comparing political generations, no statistical differences can be observed on contacting at least once a local councilor and an official of a government ministry but some differences can be seen on contacting a member of parliament. The born frees are more likely to contact a member of parliament at least once than the colonial generation. No difference exists among one-party, transitional and free generations on contacting a member of parliament at least once (Table 3).

Communing

Three items measure communing, namely: attending a community meeting, joining together with others to raise an issue and attending a protest or demonstration march. The results in Table 4 show that Mozambicans are more likely to attend, at least once, a community meeting (59 percent) and joining with others to raise an issue (53 percent) than to attend a protest or demonstration march (10 percent). By comparing political generations, the born frees appear to be least likely to attend, at least once, a community meeting than all other political generations. Together with free and one-party generations, the born frees are also least likely to join together with others to raise an issue. But there is no political generation difference on attending a demonstration or protest march (Table 4).

			Pol	itical Generati	on		
		Colonial	One party	Transitional	Free	Born frees	Total
Contacting	Never/Don't know	90%	90%	92%	91%	88%	91%
local	Only once	5%	5%	3%	6%	9%	6%
councilor	A few times	3%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%
	Often	3%	4%	3%	1%	1%	2%
	Never/Don't know	97%	93%	94%	94%	91%	94%
Contacting MP	Only once	1%	3%	4%	3%	5%	3%
	A few times	2%	2%	2%	2%	3%	2%
	Often	1%	2%		1%	1%	1%
Contacting an official of a government	Never/Don't know	93%	90%	91%	91%	90%	91%
	Only once	3%	6%	4%	5%	6%	5%
	A few times	3%	2%	3%	3%	3%	3%
ministry	Often	1%	2%	3%	1%	1%	1%

Table 3: Contacting Political Leaders by Political Generation

Question: During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about some important problem or to give them your views? A local government councilor, a member of parliament, and official of a government agency?

Table 4: Attending Community Meeting by Political Generation

				cal Generatio			
		Colonial	One party	Transitional	Free	Born free	Total
	No, would never do this/Don't know	10%	13%	6%	11%	11%	11%
Attending community	No but I would do this if I had a chance	17%	23%	29%	32%	40%	30%
meeting	Yes, once or twice	16%	16%	11%	17%	15%	16%
	Yes, several times	36%	33%	29%	29%	23%	29%
	Yes, often	21%	15%	25%	12%	11%	14%
	No, would never do this/Don't know	13%	19%	9%	15%	12%	14%
Joining others to raise an	No but I would do this if I had a chance	23%	28%	28%	35%	39%	33%
issue	Yes once or twice	12%	14%	13%	17%	23%	17%
	Yes, several times	30%	28%	28%	23%	17%	24%
	Yes often	23%	11%	22%	10%	10%	12%
	No, would never do this/Don't know	54%	56%	49%	48%	44%	49%
Attending	No but I would do this if I had a chance	39%	38%	42%	43%	45%	42%
demonstration	Yes once or twice	1%	3%	3%	4%	5%	4%
	Yes, several times	3%	3%	6%	3%	3%	3%
	Yes often	5%	1%	1%	2%	3%	2%

Question: Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. Attended a community meeting, got together with others to raise an issue, participated in demonstration or protest march?

Party Identification

The identification with a political party in Mozambique is high. A majority of about two-thirds of Mozambicans identify with a political party (Table 5). Comparing generations, the born frees are less likely to identify with a political party than other generations. Colonial and one-party generations present higher levels of party identification than other generations (Table 5).

Table 5: Party Identification by Political Generation

		Political Generation					
	Colonial	One party	Transitional	Free	Born free	Total	
Party ID	72%	71%	67%	68%	64%	68%	

Question: Do you feel close to any particular political party?

Group Membership

Besides assessing the extent to which Mozambicans and political generations identify with political parties, this study also assesses the extent to which they are affiliated to a community group. In contrast to party identification, affiliation in a community group is low. Only one-third (33 percent) of Mozambicans responded that they are a member of a community group. Of this, the transitional generation is less likely to be a member of a community group than all other generations. No statistical difference is observed among all other generations (Table 6).

			Political Generation					
		Colonial	One party	Transitional	Free	Born free	Total	
	Non a member	65%	68%	75%	66%	68%	67%	
Community	Member	12%	13%	12%	16%	17%	15%	
group membership	Active member	22%	17%	13%	15%	10%	15%	
	Leader	1%	3%		3%	5%	3%	

 Table 6: Membership in Community Group by Political Generation

Question: Are you an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member of voluntary association or community group?

Voting

An overwhelming majority of more than three-quarters (77 percent) of Mozambicans say that they have voted in the most recent election. But born frees appear to be less likely to vote that all other political generations. Transitional and one-party generations followed by colonial and free generations are more likely to say that they have voted in the past election (Table 7).

Table 7: Voting by Political Generation

Political Generation							
	Colonial	One-party	Transitional	Free	Born free	Total	
Voted in the last election	78%	84%	87%	77%	60%	77%	

Question: Understanding that some people were unable to vote in the most recent national election in 2014, which of the following statements is true for you? (...) You voted in the elections?

Engaging in Electoral Campaign

Although more than three-quarters of Mozambicans reported they have voted in the past election, their electoral campaign engagement (measured by attending an election campaign, attending a candidate or party meeting, persuading others to vote for your party, and working for a party) is shallow. Of the four modes of electoral campaign engagement assessed in this study, Mozambicans are more likely to attend an election campaign in general (38 percent), followed by persuading others to vote for their party (22 percent) and attending a candidate or party meeting (21 percent). Working for a party is the least preferred mode of Mozambicans electoral engagement (14 percent) (Table 8).

		· · ·						
		Political Generation						
	Colonial	One-party	Transitional	Free	Born free	Total		
Attending election campaign	44%	46%	45%	37%	24%	38%		
Attending candidate or party meeting	27%	27%	20%	20%	18%	21%		
Persuading others to vote for your candidate or party	22%	25%	16%	22%	24%	22%		
Working for candidate or party	18%	18%	12%	12%	13%	14%		

Table 8: Engaging in Electoral Campaign by Political Generation

Question: Thinking about the last national election in 2014, did you: Attend a campaign rally? Attend a meeting with a candidate or campaign staff? Try to persuade others to vote for a candidate or political party? Work for a candidate or party?

By comparing generations, the born frees followed by the free generation appear to be less likely to attend an election campaign. Together with free and transitional generations, the born frees are also less likely to attend a candidate or party meeting compared to colonial and one-party generations. With respect to persuading others to vote for your party, while there is not so much difference among generations, the transitional generation is least likely to engage in this form of electoral engagement. On working for a party, the older generations (colonial and one-party) are more likely to do so than younger generations, namely: born frees, free and transitional generations.

3. Modernization

This study measures modernization by: rural-urban residential location, formal education and access to news media. If the born frees are more likely to be modern than other political generations, then they will be more likely to be urban residents, with high levels of information from being taught at school, and accessing news media.

Overall, the results in Table 9 show that, Mozambicans are more likely to be rural (64 percent) than urban (36 percent) residents, with low levels of formal education. Only 39 percent of Mozambicans have secondary or tertiary education. Mozambicans also present low levels of access to news media. Although a majority of two-thirds (68 percent) of Mozambicans access news media via radio 'a few times a week or every day', only 44 percent do the same with respect to television. In addition, Mozambicans access to news media 'a few times a week or every day' via newspaper (19 percent), internet (19 percent) and social media (20 percent) is very shallow. These findings, with the exception of access to news media via radio, suggest that Mozambicans tend to be less modern.

In contrast to their citizens at large, Mozambican born frees followed by the generation of free Mozambicans are more likely to be urban dwellers compared to other political generations. With respect to formal education, the born frees appear to be more educated than other political generations. The level of secondary education increases as individuals move from more authoritarian to more free generations while primary education decreases. However, the free generation appears to be higher than born free and one-party generations in having tertiary education (Table 9). This is not surprising knowing that in the sample the Mozambique born frees are young citizens (aged 18- 21 years old and turned 18 in 2012 onwards) still at the stage of preparing themselves to have a university degree compared to the free generation.

		Political generation					
		Colonial	One- party	Transitional	Free	Born free	Total
Residential	Urban	31%	31%	29%	37%	44%	36%
location	Rural	69%	69%	71%	64%	56%	64%
Formal education	No formal education	38%	25%	20%	15%	15%	19%
	Primary	52%	51%	48%	41%	32%	43%
	Secondary	6%	17%	23%	32%	48%	29%
	Tertiary	4%	7%	10%	12%	6%	10%

Table 9: Urban-Rural Residential Location by Political Generation

Residential location question: *Urban-Rural Primary Sampling Unit.* **Formal education question:** *What is your highest level of education?*

The born frees are also more likely to access news media via television, newspaper, internet and social media compared to other political generations, with the exception of accessing news media through radio. The news media access by political generation is summarized as follows:

The born frees are less likely to access news media via radio than the generation of older adults. But:

- Followed by the free generation, born frees are more likely to obtain news through television 'every day' compared to colonial and one-party generations. Obtaining news 'every day' through television increases if the adult is much younger.
- The born frees and also the free generation, to some extent, are more likely to access news via newspapers 'every day' and 'a few times a week' than compared with colonial and one-party generations. This is not surprising knowing that the born frees and free generations lead in having high levels of formal education when compared with colonial and one-party generations.
- The born frees and to some extent free Mozambicans are far more likely to access news via the internet 'every day' than all other generations. This finding continues to hold with respect to accessing news 'a few times a week' via the internet.
- The born free and free generations are also more likely to use the new and modern mode to access news. About 22 percent of born frees and 12 percent of the free generation responded that they obtain news via social media 'every day' while less than 10 percent of colonial, one-party and transitional generations said so (Table 10).

			Politic	al Generation			
		Colonial	One party	Transitional	Free	Born free	Total
	Less than once a month	3%	2%	1%	2%	2%	2%
Radio	A few times a month	5%	5%	2%	5%	5%	5%
i laulo	A few times a week	15%	14%	20%	21%	27%	20%
	Every day	52%	49%	52%	48%	43%	48%
	Less than once a month	3%	4%	4%	2%	3%	3%
тν	A few times a month	3%	5%	3%	4%	3%	4%
I V	A few times a week	5%	7%	4%	8%	7%	7%
	Every day	26%	27%	35%	39%	46%	37%
	Less than once a month	7%	4%	9%	6%	2%	5%
Newspaper	A few times a month	4%	6%	7%	9%	7%	8%
Newspaper	A few times a week	4%	7%	9%	12%	13%	10%
	Every day	9%	7%	9%	9%	17%	9%
	Less than once a month	2%	1%	4%	3%	2%	3%
Internet	A few times a month	1%	2%	2%	5%	6%	4%
Internet	A few times a week	2%	5%	5%	10%	12%	8%
	Every day	8%	5%	5%	12%	22%	11%
	Less than once a month	1%	1%	1%	3%	0%	2%
Social	A few times a month	1%	1%	2%	4%	5%	3%
media	A few times a week	3%	7%	4%	10%	13%	9%
	Every day	7%	3%	5%	12%	22%	11%

Table 10: Access to News Media by Political Generation

Question: How often do you get news from radio, television, newspaper, internet and social media?

4. Attitudes toward Democracy

This study assesses attitudes toward democracy firstly by commitment to democracy, which is a multidimensional construct that combines the concepts of support for democracy and a broader rejection of authoritarian regimes (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005). Support for democracy is the preference for a democratic political regime against its alternatives; and rejection of authoritarian forms of government is a 'strong disapproval' of authoritarian forms of government, namely: one-party, military and one-man. People who are committed to democracy simultaneously prefer democracy to any other form of government; and 'strongly disapprove' those three forms of authoritarian governments (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005, Mattes and Shin 2005, Shenga 2007:12-13).

Secondly, it assesses attitudes towards democracy by the understanding of democracy. As democracy may mean many things to different people such as elections, participation, competition, rule of law, accountability to civil liberties and political, social and economic rights, those who are able to respond to at least one particular aspect about democracy correctly are deemed to understand democracy. I consider that one understands democracy if he or she can provide at least one 'correct answer' of what democracy is.

Commitment to Democracy

The data show, in general, that Mozambicans are less committed to democracy. Only 45 percent of respondents express they prefer democracy to any other form of government; and combined, 15 percent strongly disapprove one-party, military and one-man authoritarian governments (Figure 1).




Figure 1: Popular Commitment to Democracy in Mozambique, 2002-2015

Compared to previous years, popular commitment to democracy in Mozambigue has declined significantly. Support for democracy that tended to increase over time declined drastically from 63 percent in 2012 to 45 percent in 2015. Strong disapprovals to authoritarian forms of government that increased in 2008 and 2012 declined significantly in 2015. The lack of popular commitment to democracy in Mozambique may be explained by the escalation of political violence in 2013 and then in 2015 that Mozambicans may view peace as more important than democracy.¹⁰

Are born frees more likely to prefer democracy than other generations? Unexpectedly, the data shows that the born free are less likely to prefer democracy than all other political generations. The transitional generation leads in preferring democracy (Table 11). Perhaps this should not be surprising. While the born frees were born under a free democratic environment and tend to possess high levels of information from formal education and access to news media, which positively tends to affect citizens' democratic commitment (see Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005, Shenga 2007), the democracy teaching in Mozambique's education curricula is shallow¹¹ to influence 'apprentice citizens'¹² to be committed democrats. The born frees tend to get to adulthood without receiving enough 'political sophistication' at school about democracy.

		Colonial	One party	Transitional	Free	Born free	Total
Support for democracy	Democracy preferable	45%	46%	48%	45%	39%	45%
Rejection of one-party rule	Disapprove strongly	20%	21%	20%	17%	15%	18%
Rejection of military rule	Disapprove strongly	19%	18%	9%	13%	21%	15%
Rejection of one-man rule	Disapprove strongly	12%	17%	4%	10%	13%	11%

Table 11: Support for Democracy and Rejection of Authoritarian Regimes by **Political Generation**

Support for democracy is measured by question: How often do you get news from the following sources? 1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government. 2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable. 2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable. Rejection of authoritarian regimes is measured by the question: There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives? A. Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office. B. The army comes in to govern the country. C. Elections and parliament are abolished so that the president can decide everything.

¹⁰ After the end of war in 1992 and the conduct of the founding multiparty election in 1994, some pointed out that the high level of turnout in the founding democratic election is explained by peace - that Mozambicans voted for peace (see Manning 2002, Yoshiura 1996 and Torvinen 2013). ¹¹ This finding is from the CPGD forthcoming paper on "The School as an Institution of Representative

Democracy in Mozambique".

¹² 'Apprentice citizens' are under 18 years old; they have not reached adulthood yet.

That colonial and one-party generations are more likely to prefer democracy than any other form of government might be explained by the experience that the older generations passed through in their lifetime. They are able to compare the freedom that democracy can provide to the people today against the limitation of freedom that authoritarian, colonial and one-party governments could not. The positive high connection of the transitional and free generations with preference of democracy might also be explained by their lifetime experience. Although the free generation were 'apprentice citizens' during one-party government, some still remember the one-party experience and thus can compare the virtues of democracy with the limitation of freedom of the one-party government. The same applies, to a larger extent, to the transitional generation.

Are born frees more likely to reject one-party, military and one-man rules? The born frees are less likely to 'disapprove strongly' one-party government compared to colonial, one-party and transitional generations. But they are likely to 'disapprove strongly' to military rule compared to transitional and free generations. Once again, the transitional generation appear to be less likely to 'disapprove strongly' one-man rule.

In the multivariate analysis section of this paper these four items measuring commitment to democracy are combined into single item as a composite index of commitment to democracy.

Understanding Democracy

Moving to the second measure of attitudes toward democracy i.e. understanding of what democracy is, ordinary citizens were asked, "What if anything does democracy mean to you?" If an individual was able to provide a correct answer (meaning they identified at least one item that measures democracy) then Afrobarometer coders coded that he or she understands democracy. Otherwise their answer was coded that he or she does not understand democracy.

Overall, Mozambicans' level of understanding of democracy is shallow when compared with the average of 36 African multiparty political systems (66 percent). Only about 58 percent of Mozambicans were able to understand what democracy is. By breaking down this data by political generation, we observe that one-party, transitional, free and then the born frees are more likely to understand democracy than the colonial generation (Table 12).

	Political Generation					Total
	Colonial	One-party	Transitional	Free	Born free	Total
Understand democracy	51%	60%	59%	58%	56%	58%

Question: What if anything does democracy mean to you?

In sum, at the mass level, Mozambique is transforming to become a democracy without supporters. Citizens are not only less committed to democracy but their democratic commitment is declining over time. In addition, their level of

understanding of democracy is shallow. Among political generations, the born frees those who were born in a free democratic environment and with higher levels of information, are less committed to democracy. Although born frees are to some extent likely to understand democracy, they are far away from leading in the understanding of what democracy is.

Knowledge about Democratic Citizenship

Knowledge about democratic citizenship is measured by the following survey question: "For each of the following actions, please tell me whether you think it is something a good citizen in a democracy should always do, never do, or do only if they choose?" This question was asked on: vote in elections; complain to government officials when public services are of poor quality; and pay taxes they owe to government. Those who say 'always do' are deemed to have knowledge about democratic citizenship while those who say 'never do' are deemed to not.

To what extent does being born and growing up democratic make an individual to be knowledgeable about democratic citizenship? Overall, the results in Table 13 show that Mozambican citizens score high in two out of three indicators of knowledge about democratic citizenship. About three-quarters (78 percent) and six-in-ten (61 percent), respectively, say that voting in elections and paying taxes they owe to government is something that a good citizen should 'always do' in a democracy. But more less than half (43 percent) say so, with respect to complain to government officials when the services are of poor quality.

Comparing political generations, generational difference is evident in two of the three measures of knowledge about democratic citizenship. The born frees are less likely to be knowledgeable that complaining about poor service is something that a good citizen in a democracy should always do. The transitional generation is more likely to know that paying taxes is something that a good citizen in a democracy should always do (Table 13). Instead of using these three items as if they were separate attitudes, in the multivariate analysis section of this paper they are combined in a single item as a composite index of knowledge about democratic citizenship.

		Total				
	Colonial	One-party	Transitional	Free	Born free	Total
Vote in elections	79%	78%	79%	78%	77%	78%
Complain on poor service	44%	44%	42%	44%	38%	43%
Pay taxes	60%	61%	66%	61%	64%	61%

Table 13: Knowledge about Democratic Citizenship by Political Generation

Question: For each of the following actions, please tell me whether you think it is something a good citizen in a democracy should always do, never do, or do only if they choose: Vote in elections; complain to government officials when public services are of poor quality; and pay taxes they owe to government.

5. The Model of Attitudes toward Democracy

So far I have tested and examined the effect of political generations on political engagement; modernization and three attitudes towards democracy: commitment to democracy, understanding of democracy, and knowledge about democratic citizenship. This section tests the effect of political generations, considering simultaneously, the effects of engagement in politics and modernity on attitudes toward democracy. As attitudes toward democracy are associated to one another¹³ I also include them as determining variables.

Other things being equal, the multivariate analysis in Table 14 shows that growing up democratic can have a negative effect on commitment toward and understanding of democracy. In other words, born frees are less likely than their older generations to form attitudes to be committed democrats and understand what democracy is.

Table 14. model of Addiddes Toward Bernoordey						
	Commitment to		Knowledge about			
	democracy	of democracy	democratic			
			citizenship			
Political generation (born frees)	056*	064**	.026			
Political engagement						
Cognitive engagement	001	.129***	.145***			
Contacting political leaders	063**	041	.006			
Communing	.008	005	.158***			
Party identification	051*	.004	.081***			
Membership voluntary or	.051*	.008	037			
community group	.051	.000	037			
Engaging in electoral campaign	021	.045	006			
Voting	.045*	.100***	.141***			
Modernization						
Residential location (Rural)	003	029	052**			
Formal education	.087**	.188***	.063**			
News media	.105***	.009	.009			
Understanding of democracy	.073**	х	.080***			
Knowledge about democratic	.099***	.083***	x			
citizenship						
Commitment to democracy	x	.069**	.090			
Adjusted R Square	.064	.118	.148			
Ν	2,400	2,400	2,400			

Table 14: Model of Attitudes Toward Democracy

Entries are OLS Regression standardized beta coefficient. * =significant at <.05, ** =significant at <.01 and ***=significant at <.001 (significant effects highlighted in bold), x=variable not included in analysis.

Cognitive engagement, which is a construct of interest in public affairs and discussion of politics, has a positive impact on understanding of democracy and knowledge about democratic citizenship. Mozambicans who engage themselves cognitively (in: discussion of politics with others and interest in public affairs) are more likely to understand what democracy is as well as to know that voting in

¹³ Those who were satisfied with democracy appeared to be more supportive for democracy in Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain (Gunther and Montero 2016:46)

elections, complaining about poor service and paying taxes is something that a good citizen should always do.

Contacting political leaders¹⁴ has an effect on commitment toward democracy but that effect is negative. Mozambicans who contact political leaders (members of parliament, officials of a government ministry and/or a local councilor) often are less likely to be committed democrats. This negative effect of contacting political leaders on commitment to democracy may be because Mozambicans perceive them as unaccountable and unrepresentative, as a result of the political context of the electoral system. The closed list electoral system widens the distance between representatives and represented. It makes representatives (political leaders) to be less representative and accountable to voters than their party bosses who tend to enlist them in the lists.

Communing¹⁵ has a positive impact on knowledge about democratic citizenship. Individuals who come together with others in collective actions often tend to be more knowledgeable about democratic citizenship than those who do not. Identification with a particular political party counts negatively on commitment toward democracy but positively on knowledge about democratic citizenship. This suggests that it makes people to know what a good citizen should always do in a democracy but does not make them to commit to democratic institutions, procedures and values. This is an anomaly that party institutions may need to act upon to foster their identifiers.

Different than party identification, is group membership. People who are members of a voluntary association or community group are more likely to be committed democrats than others. Engaging with an electoral campaign (which is a composite index of attending a campaign rally, a meeting with a candidate or campaign staff, persuading others to vote for a candidate or party and working for a candidate or party) has no effect at all on attitudes toward democracy, as none of its coefficients are significant. But voting has significant impacts on all three attitudes towards democracy and those impacts are all positive. People who vote in elections do not only tend to be committed democrats, but also tend to understand what democracy is as well as be knowledgeable about what a good citizen in a democracy should always do.

Modernization effects show that Mozambicans who live in rural areas are less likely to know that voting, complaining about a poor service and paying taxes is something that a good citizen should always do in a democracy than urban residents. Formal education matters positively on all three attitudes toward democracy and its impact is biggest in relation to understanding of what democracy is. Access to news media makes a positive difference on commitment to democracy, suggesting that those who access news media often tend more to be committed democrats than others.

¹⁴ Contacting political leaders is an index of contacting members of parliament, officials of a government ministry and/or local government council.

¹⁵ Communing is an index of attending a demonstration or protest march, attending a community meeting and joining others to raise an issue.

Last but not least are the effects of attitudes towards democracy. The results show that all of them are connected to one another. These connections are presented as follows:

- Individuals who understand what a democracy is are more likely to be committed democrats as well as becoming knowledgeable about democratic citizenship;
- Those who are knowledge about democratic citizenship tend to be committed democrats and understand what democracy is; and
- Those individuals who are committed democrats are more likely to understand democracy as well as be knowledgeable about democratic citizenship.

6. Conclusions and Discussion

This study tested the effect of Mozambique's political generations considering simultaneously other factors on three attitudes toward democracy: commitment to and understanding of democracy and knowledge about democratic citizenship. Public opinion survey results revealed that political generations matter with respect to attitudes towards democracy, but Mozambicans who were born and grew up democratic tend not to be committed to democracy as well as understand what democracy is compared to older generations.

This negative effect of growing up democratic on attitudes to democracy in Mozambique may be explained by civic education on democracy that the younger generations receive in the country. As apprentice-citizens, younger generations receive at school very little education on contemporary Mozambique (Shenga and Howe, forthcoming) "inculcating students with the workings of democracy and government as well as the rights and responsibilities of democratic citizenship" (Denemark, Mattes and Niemi 2016:8). This study also found that Mozambique's born frees appear to be more modern than older generations but less likely to be engaged in politics. In order to engage the younger generations in politics as well as making them to form attitudes that are supportive of democracy, the educational system needs to include in the school curriculum not only teaching about democracy but also engage students with institutions of representative democracy.

Besides political generations this study also tested the impact of other factors. Those that appear to unexpectedly have had an effect deserve a discussion. This includes party identification and contacting political leaders.

Identification of political parties appears to be connected negatively with commitment to democracy but positively with knowledge about democratic citizenship. This tells us that as citizens identify with a party they know about democracy but do not commit to its institutions, procedures and values. Parties make individuals to know democracy but not to commit to it. Something that requires further investigation related to this is to verify to which party those who identify with a party tend to mainly identify with – whether it is with the ruling party or an opposition party. The question to investigate is whether the identification with the ruling party or an opposition party is the one driving the negative effect. Based on this, party-strengthening programmes can be designed to change this anomaly.

Contact with political leaders appears to be negatively associated with commitment to democracy. This may be a reflection of the electoral system which distances the relationship between voters and political leaders. Since Mozambique's political leaders are elected through a party closed list electoral system that widens the gap between representatives and represented, political leaders may be less accountable and responsive to their voters when contacted. As a consequence, those who contact political leaders may end up disillusioned or frustrated and thus view that the democratic system does not work and is not delivering on their expectations and needs.

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